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Continuity and discontinuity ʹ a theoretical reflection 
By Damian E M Milton (2002) 
There seems to be in society, a need for unity and stability as expressed by Garfinkel in regard to 
individual consciousness. However, there seems to be an equal and opposite push in the other 
direction  ? towards discontinuity. There is an obvious need for both unity and discontinuity  ? for 
resolution and non-resolution in the course of human history. What is fascinating socially speaking is 
where these needs are expressed. 
For many philosophers, objectivity is impossible, as any account has to have an ideological element 
from a unique individual. One cannot have a  ?view from nowhere ?. 
Person A whose subjectivity is that of the  ?outsider ? cannot help but be attracted to theories and 
expressions of discontinuity and relativism. 
Person B whose subjectivity is based on success according to set rules and upon integration into a 
unified structure cannot help but be attracted to theories and expressions of continuity and stability. 
This argument goes beyond that of the interactionist approach of Becker who argues that those who 
deviate from the norm internalise the labels given to them and re-adjust personal narratives to fit. It 
also goes beyond the argument of the  ?natural attitude ? as proposed by Garfinkel as individual 
attitudes are not based on a universal set of competing attitudes searching for discontinuity and 
continuity with others through attempts at communication and non-communication. For example, 
slang both includes and excludes. 
Due to the logic of power structures  ? the most ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐǁŝƚŚ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŽĨƐŽĐŝĂů
processes will usually have a vested interest in the norms of society and giving the impression of 
unity and common purpose. To the extent of playing to the fantasy of a knowable life  ? the happy 
ending of a typical Hollywood movie. These form the dominant forms of expression within the 
mainstream of society. Therefore, expressions of discontinuity are more likely found in the individual 
artistic expressions or from the socially marginalised or from the deliberately eccentric dynamic 
character. For instance: cult movie directors such as David Lynch and Peter Greenaway. 
Deconstruction attempts to show the discontinuity in the unity. Ethnomethodology does the 
opposite. My work hopefully expresses openly attempts to do both. To resolve and dissolve, never 
completing either. Both unity and discontinuity are dependent upon each other as opposites. Any 
resolution will have a dissenter, and any dissolution will come from a personal force whose will to 
resolve (however impossible) will never die out. My work exposes this inherent double bind. As 
Derrida says: 
 ?Deconstruction is not a memory which simply recalls what is already there. The memory work is 
also an unforeseeable event, an event that demands a responsibility and gestures, deeds. This act is 
caught, however, in a double bind: the more you remember, the more you are in danger of effacing, 
and vice versa. Deconstruction cannot step out of this aporia, of this double-bind, without 
difference. ? (Derrida, 1994). 
Through the course of this project, oŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŚŽĐŬƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǀŽŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ?ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƐďĞŝŶŐŚĞĂƌĚ ?
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǀŽŝĐĞŽĨƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚŚĂƌŵŽŶǇƵƐƵĂůůǇĂůůƵĚĞĚƚŽŝŶƚŚĞ ?ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŶŽƌŵ ?ĨĂŵŝůǇŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? 
papering over the cracks of the past. 
